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The promulgation of sentencing guidelines by the United States Sen-
tencing Commission,1 if ultimately deemed valid, will introduce a new era
in the application of criminal sanctions in federal court. The past pattern
of sentencing, under which the judge had exclusive authority to set sanc-
tions within typically broad congressional ranges, will disappear entirely.
In the future, an administrative agency composed of seven commissioners,
appointed and removable by the President,2 will determine the range of
sentences that the judge may impose.
The Sentencing Commission undoubtedly is a convenient solution' to
the problem of sentence disparity.4 However, convenience is not a hall-
mark of the separation of powers5 and does not cure a violation of its
dictates. The Constitution's separation of powers into three branches pro-
vides "structural protections against abuse of power"' that do not turn
upon the momentary beneficence of particular officers. The Sentencing
1. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 991, 98 Stat. 1837,
2017 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. III 1985)). This Note goes to press as the Commission is
issuing its first set of guidelines. Rather than analyzing any particular guidelines, the Note takes
cognizance of the Commission's admonition that it "is a permanent body, empowered by law to write
and rewrite guidelines, with progressive changes, over many years," U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 1.7 (Apr. 13,
1987) [hereinafter APRIL 1987 GUIDELINES], and examines the statute under which the Commission
acts.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a).
3. Indeed, Congress tried to avoid controversial political decisions in its debate on the Sentencing
Commission. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REc. S743 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(reporting agreement with Senator Thurmond to "resist anything remotely approaching a controver-
sial amendment"); id. at S754 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("divisive issues" separated from major
effort to achieve sentencing reform).
4. The differences in sentences imposed on defendants who have committed the same offenses is
commonly referred to as sentence disparity. See 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 72 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds. 1983) [hereinafter 1 RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING]. Objections to sentencing disparity and attempts to confine discretion date from the
1960's. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962). Such objections greatly increased
with allegations that the prison riots of the 1970's were caused in part by frustration with disparate
sentences. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, Do-
ING JUSTICE (1976).
5. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
6. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3189 (1986).
7. Id.
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Commission imperils the liberty protected by the separation of powers'
not only because it vests the executive branch with the judicial and legisla-
tive power of determining sentences, but also because the President ob-
tains the power to appoint and remove judges9 to a non-judicial body.
Before the legal challenges to the Commission's guidelines create havoc in
federal sentencing, and the Parole Commission is divested of authority to
release persons sentenced under the guidelines,' 0 Congress should restruc-
ture the Commission and eliminate the binding effects of its guidelines."
I. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
The establishment of the Sentencing Commission under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 198412 constitutes a marked change in the administration
of criminal justice in the federal system. The judge has long been required
to impose a sentence on a convicted defendant based on an individualized
determination of his culpability."3 Appellate review of sentences has rarely
been available,' 4 and the United States Parole Commission has deter-
mined whether and when to release defendants sentenced to a term of
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
9. The president must select at least three judges for the Commission from a list of six nominated
by the Judicial Conference. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 1985).
10. See infra text accompanying note 19.
11. The issues discussed in this Note were first raised by Chief Justice Burger, who objected to
the idea of full-time membership on the Commission of three judges in active service. Letter from
Chief Justice Burger to President Reagan (Dec. 13, 1984) (copy on file with author); see Strasser,
Sentencing Panel May Start Soon, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1985, at 5, col. 1. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. 3181, increased doubts about the Commission's constitutionality. See
Strasser, Is Sentencing Panel on the Rocks?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (Sentencing Com-
mission will likely have to ask Congress to resolve threat to its constitutionality); Supreme Court
Report: Gramm-Rudman Held Invalid, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 52, 61 (predicting constitutional
challenge to Sentencing Commission); Wermiel, Commission on Criminal Sentencing Is Tangled in
Controversy About Its Makeup and Its Mission, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1987, at 60, col. 1; Hon.
Edward E. Becker, Testimony Before the United States Sentencing Commission 21-22 (Dec. 3, 1986)
(transcript on file with author) (listing possible constitutional challenges). One commentator, writing
about an earlier proposal, concluded that the promulgation of sentencing guidelines by a Commission
composed of judges and non-judges appointed by the President, would violate neither the separation of
powers nor the nondelegation doctrine. Note, The United States Sentencing Commission: A Constitu-
tional Delegation of Congressional Power, 55 IND. L.J. 117 (1979).
12. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
13. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949).
14. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (no appellate review of sentences in
federal system). In the most complete judicial analysis of the subject, Judge Jerome Frank concluded
that though the courts of appeals arguably have statutory power to revise sentences, the exercise of
that power was precluded by extensive judicial precedent. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583,
604-06 (2d Cir. 1952); see also Kutak & Gottschalk, In Search of a Rational Sentence: A Return to
the Concept of Appellate Review, 53 NEB. L. REv. 463 (1974) (analyzing background of "axiomatic"
principle that criminal sentences are beyond scope of appellate review). Under the current federal
system, sentences may be challenged only on the basis that they are unconstitutional, illegal, or im-
posed on a "mechanical" basis. See infra note 174.
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imprisonment.15 A product of the revolt against the disparity that this sen-
tencing system produced,1 the sentencing guideline system will replace
individualized consideration with a uniform sentence for all offenders who
fit within each administratively established classification.17 Under the new
system, the sentence will be determinate,"8 and the United States Parole
Commission will be abolished. 9
The Sentencing Commission will exercise vast discretion over the fed-
eral criminal law. Its guidelines will determine, on the basis of criminal
history and current offense, whether a fine, probation, incarceration,2 ° or
even possibly death 21 will be imposed on a convicted defendant. The
guidelines will also specify binding ranges for the prison terms that de-
fendants must serve, the maximum of which may be no more than twenty-
five per cent greater than the minimum.22 Although the Commission was
directed to base the guidelines on principles of incapacitation, deterrence,
punishment, and rehabilitation, Congress has provided the Commission no
basis for resolving the conflicts that frequently arise23 among these objec-
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1982) (authorizing United States Parole Commission to release pris-
oner if release would not "depreciate the seriousness of the offense" or "jeopardize the public wel-
fare"). For discussion of the United States Parole Commission and the differences between its guide-
lines for release and those of the United States Sentencing Commission, see infra text accompanying
notes 81-87.
16. See Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualiza-
tion of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (1975); see also Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sen-
tencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66
GEo. L.J. 975, 980 (1978) (hereinafter Coffee, Repressed Issues] (Sentencing Commission will re-
place "micro" decisions involving individual cases with "macro" decisionmaking about classes of
persons).
17. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3234 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225] ("[S]entencing guidelines system ... is
intended to treat all classes of offenses committed by all categories of offenders consistently."); infra
text accompanying notes 39-40 (describing effect of guidelines).
18. A determinate sentence requires the defendant to actually serve the entire term imposed. See 1
RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 133-35.
19. The Parole Commission will establish release dates for all persons sentenced under current
sentencing practice but will be abolished five years after the effective date of the first guidelines. Pub.
L. No. 98-473, § 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2032 (1984).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
21. See Memorandum for Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., from U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel (Jan. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Justice Department Memorandum] (copy on file
with author) (arguing that Commission has authority to promulgate capital punishment guidelines).
Because of political considerations, the Commission decided not to include capital punishment within
its first set of guidelines; however, according to its Chairman, the Commission may address the death
penalty issue soon. U.S. Panel, Bowing to Congress, Votes Against the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 11, 1987, at A22, col. 3. But cf Freed & Liman, Federal Panel Has No Authority over the
Death Penalty, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 13, col. 1. (arguing that Commission lacks legal power
to restore death penalty).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1), (b) (Supp. III 1985). The range may be less than 25%. See S. REP.
No. 223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1983) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 223] ("The breadth of the sen-
tencing range provided in each guideline is a matter for the Commission to decide so long as it is
within the 25-percent limit . . .).
23. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 284-85 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing failure to articulate sentencing policy from among four purposes of criminal law); United
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tives.24 The Commission may specify a sentence for a particular offense
primarily on an assessment of the offense's harm to the community rela-
tive to the harm from other offenses.25 Within the wide ranges established
by Congress,2" the Commission will decide what sentence a particular of-
fense should receive and whether the judge should have any discretion in
its imposition.2
Because of the presumed judicial expertise in sentencing,28 the seven-
member Commission is established as an independent agency in the judi-
cial branch. 29 Recognizing that the establishment of sentencing policy was
not exclusively a judicial function,30 however, Congress rejected proposals
to place authority to promulgate guidelines solely in the judiciary x and
instead constituted the Commission with a distinctly executive character.
Unlike other judicial branch agencies, whose members are appointed and
controlled by article III judges, 2 the commissioners of the Sentencing
Commission are appointed and may be removed by the President,33 and
States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (canvassing different principles for imposition
of criminal sentence); H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1968) (describing criminal law as competition between "partly discrepant
principles").
24. The Commission may not impose a term of imprisonment for purposes of rehabilitation. 28
U.S.C. § 994(k). In addition, the Sentencing Reform Act requires the Commission to establish guide-
lines specifying a substantial term of imprisonment for drug offenders, violent criminals, persons who
participate in racketeering activity in a managerial capacity, and recidivists. See id. § 994(h)-(i). With
those exceptions, the statute provides no rule for resolving conflicts among the purposes of
punishment.
25. See S. REP. No. 223, supra note 22, at 167 (changed community norms regarding offenses
such as possession of marijuana and draft evasion may justify increasing or decreasing sentence).
26. Except for the provisions for mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1982)
(treason), 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982) (continuing criminal enterprise), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i), (n) (1982)
(aircraft piracy), and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.), there are no mandatory minimum sentences in the federal
code. Consequently, a judge may impose any sentence up to the specified statutory maximum.
27. See Corrections Dig., Feb. 4, 1987, at 9, 10 (although initial guidelines give judges much
discretion, Commission will be able to eliminate judges' discretion within one year).
28. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SEN-
TENCING SYSTEM 74 (1977).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 1985).
30. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 17, at 3247.
31. See S. 1182, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposing Committee on Sentencing Guidelines
within Judicial Conference of United States, whose members would be appointed and removable by
Judicial Conference).
32. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (federal
magistrates); Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 97-103 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (Judicial Conference, Judicial Council, and Administrative Office of United States
Courts); United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236, 238 & n.3 (probation officers), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 990 (1974); In re Tom Carter Enters., 44 Bankr. 605, 608-09 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) (bank-
ruptcy judges); Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles of Article 11I, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1947,
1959-62 (1984). As Owen Fiss has noted, these officers exist in a hierarchical relationship with
article III judges. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1446 (1983).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 1985). Commission members may be removed by the President
for "neglect of duty, malfeasance or other good cause shown." Id. All Commission members receive
the same salaries as judges of the United States Courts of Appeals. Id. § 992(c). The Department of
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include the Attorney General and the Chairman of the United States Pa-
role Commission.3 4 The guidelines have legal force similar to regulations
issued by administrative or executive agencies. Although the guidelines
must sit before Congress for 180 days before they go into effect, only con-
gressional legislation can block the implementation of the guidelines or
change any of their terms.3 5
Guidelines issued by sentencing commissions are now in force in several
jurisdictions.3" However, the federal Commission is the most ambitious
extension of the sentencing commission concept.3 7 Not only will the Com-
mission's recommendations automatically govern the imposition of sanc-
tions in all federal criminal cases unless Congress enacts countervailing
legislation, but the guidelines will restrict sentencing judges far more than
the restrictions in effect in any of the states or court systems that have
adopted guideline systems.38 The statute establishing the Commission pro-
Justice has proposed an amendment to clarify that the salary increase that a United States district
judge serving on the Commission receives should be treated as a stipend. Department of Justice,
Minor and Technical Amendments to Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, at 14 (1986) [here-
inafter Proposed Minor and Technical Amendments] (copy on file with author).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). Unlike the seven other presidential appointees, these two are ex officio,
non-voting members of the Commission. The Attorney General or his representative is a permanent
ex officio member. Id. The Chairman of the United States Parole Commission is a member for the
Commission's first term. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2033 (1984).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 921.001(4)(a) (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West Supp.
1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2151 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.94A.010 (Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.011 (West 1985). Commissions in Maine, Connecti-
cut, South Carolina, and New York have failed to enact guidelines. See generally Tonry, Sentencing
Guidelines and Sentencing Commissions-The Second Generation, in SENTFNCING REFORM GuID-
ANCE OR GUIDELINES? 22, 30-37 (K. Pease & M. Wasik eds. 1987) (describing work of state com-
missions). Sentencing guidelines have also been adopted by, among others, the Maryland judiciary, see
MD. CRiM. LAW CODE ANN. § 643C (Supp. 1986) (authorizing sentencing guidelines), and the Phil-
adelphia Court of Common Pleas, the Cook County Circuit Court in Chicago, Illinois, and the Essex
County Court in New Jersey, see J. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE 10 (1980). For a thorough,
but already dated, description of other efforts to establish sentencing commissions, see S. SHANE-
DuBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES (1985).
37. See Judge Wilkins Sworn in as Chairman of U.S. Sentencing Commission, THE THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1986, at 6 (statement by Judge Wilkins) (Commission's work represents "the first
effort in history by any country to adopt mandatory sentencing guidelines").
38. Most of the commission-promulgated guidelines are presumptive. In Florida, Minnesota, and
Washington, the judge is ordinarily required to impose a guideline sentence; the courts monitor depar-
tures through appellate review. The trial judge, however, may depart from the guideline sentence if
there are "clear and convincing reasons," Mayed v. State, 455 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984), "substantial or compelling circumstances," State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn.
1981), or "substantial and compelling reasons," WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.011 (West Supp.
1986). Because these Commissions' guidelines allow the judge to depart for a variety of reasons and
provide a broad right to appeal, a common law of sentencing may develop in these states. See, e.g.,
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, THE IMPACT ON THE MINNESOTA SENTENCE
GUIDELINES 111-28 (1984). Fewer enforcement mechanisms are provided in Pennsylvania and Wis-
consin. In Pennsylvania, the defendant and government may appeal a sentence, regardless of whether
it is within the guidelines. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2151 (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1986); see also
Commonwealth v. Frazier, 347 Pa. Super. 64, 500 A.2d 158, 161 (1985) ("Although [Pennsylvania's]
Sentencing Guidelines are found within the Sentencing Code . . . it was not the intention of the
Legislature to adopt Guidelines as a way to preclude judicial discretion."). In Wisconsin, no appellate
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vides that the court "shall" impose a sentence within the guidelines, unless
the court finds a factor in the case not adequately considered by the Com-
mission.3 9 A judge who disagrees with the guidelines themselves and not
with their application to the particular case may not deviate from the
guideline sentence.40 Even if a judge believes that a particular sentence is
too harsh for a person convicted of a certain crime, she must impose that
sentence if the offense and offender fit within the Commission's
classifications.
To reduce judicial discretion in sentencing even further, Congress has
for the first time provided for the appeal of criminal sentences. 4' Both the
government and the defendant may appeal any sentence outside the guide-
lines. 42 Sentences within the guidelines may be appealed only if the guide-
lines are applied incorrectly or in violation of law.43 Although the courts
of appeals must uphold deviations from the guidelines if they are reasona-
ble,4 ' deviations for factors adequately considered by the Commission will
likely not be considered reasonable."
review is available for departures, and the court need only state reasons on the record to impose a
sentence outside the guidelines. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.012 (West 1985). All of the purely court-
promulgated guidelines are voluntary. See, e.g., Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 367, 470 A.2d 337,
338 (1984); see also J. KRESS, supra note 36, at 12 ("Deviations from the suggested guideline
sentences are expected and even encouraged. . . ."). For further discussion of the differences between
mandatory, presumptive, and voluntary guidelines, see 1 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING, Supra note 4,
at 135-39, 178-79.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. III 1985). Demonstrating their commitment to the view that the
Commission, not the appellate courts, should make sentencing decisions, the Senate rejected an
amendment proposed by Senator Mathias that would have permitted the judge to impose a sentence
outside the guidelines even if the Commission had considered and rejected the aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors. See S. REP. No. 223, supra note 22, at 76.
40. See Rezneck, The New Federal Criminal Sentencing Provisions, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 785,
786 (1985) (guidelines not intended to be "merely precatory"). But see S. REP. No. 225, supra note
17, at 51 ("The sentencing guidelines system will not remove all of the judge's sentencing discretion.
Instead, it will guide the judge in making his decision on the appropriate sentence.").
41. See supra note 14 (describing appellate review of sentences in federal system).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3) (Supp. 1111985). The standard of review for sentences outside
the guidelines is whether the sentence is "unreasonable." Id. § 3742(d). The provision for government
appeal of sentences is not unprecedented. Under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3576 (1982), the government may appeal the sentence of a "dangerous special offender." That
appeal provision was upheld against a double jeopardy challenge in United States v. DiFrancesco, 449
U.S. 117 (1980).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 37 42(a)(1)-(2), (b)(l)-(2) (Supp. III 1985).
44. Id. § 3742(d).
45. The court of appeals' reasonableness calculation is to be based upon the reasons given for the
imposition of a particular sentence, id., reasons that in the case of a departure must include factors
not adequately considered by the Commission, id. § 3553(b). According to the legislative history,
neither the district courts nor the appellate courts are to consider the substance of a guideline. See S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 17, at 153 (district judge may depart only for factors not adequately
considered by Commission); id. at 181 (guidelines not subject to appellate review). Thus as the Com-
mission steadily eliminates factors on which the judge may base a departure, see id. at 154, all flexi-
bility will be removed from application of the guidelines. If, however, the terms "not adequately
considered," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), and "in violation of law," id. § 3742, are interpreted expansively to
allow for departures and appellate review of the substance of the guidelines, the nondelegation chal-
lenge might be met. Cf Conyers, Unresolved Issues in the Federal Sentencing Reform Act, 32 FED.
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In addition to the guidelines, the Commission will also promulgate pol-
icy statements for plea bargains,"6 recommend legislation concerning the
criminal justice system to Congress, 47 and respond to petitions from of-
fenders who allege that the guidelines for their offense should be
changed.4  Because the Commission's responsibilities are so great, the first
commissioners are serving on a full-time basis.49 Federal judges on the
Commission are excused from their responsibility to reside in their judi-
cial districts. 50
II. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
AS AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER
The Sentencing Reform Act violates the separation of powers in two
ways. Locating the power to determine sentences in an administrative
agency violates the nondelegation doctrine. At the same time, the require-
ment that three article III judges sit on the Sentencing Commission, with
the possibility that the President might appoint-and discharge-up to six
judges, compromises judicial independence and impartiality.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I of the Constitution provides that "all legislative powers...
shall be vested in the Congress of the United States."" The nondelegation
doctrine embodies the notion that the "formulation of policy is a legisla-
ture's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate.""2 Though
perhaps underenforced, 53 the doctrine retains vitality. The nondelegation
B. NEws & J. 68, 69-70 (1985) (suggesting that defendant be permitted to appeal guideline sentence
on grounds that it is greater than necessary to serve statutory purposes of sentencing).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1985).
47. The Commission is required to report to Congress both its recommendations for new correc-
tional facilities, id. § 994(g), and for changes in penal sanctions, id. § 994(q).
48. Id. § 994(r) ("The Commission shall give due consideration to any petition filed by a defend-
ant requesting modification in the guidelines utilized in sentencing such defendant."). The Commis-
sion is also empowered to establish a research and development program on sentencing, to collect data
on sentencing, and to conduct sentencing programs and workshops. Id. § 995(a).
49. Id. § 992(c). After the first six years, all members of the Commission except the Chairman
will hold part-time positions. Id.
50. 28 U.S.C.A. § 992(d) (West Supp. 1987).
51. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 1.
52. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
53. Few federal statutes have been held unconstitutional in full under the nondelegation doctrine.
See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). However, as numerous commentators have noted, the difficulties in the
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine derive less from uncertainty about its status as a constitu-
tional norm than from the difficulties in establishing precise criteria for its application. See, e.g.,
Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 62; cf. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1219 n.22, 1226 (1978) (constitutional
norms may be underenforced because of absence of judicially manageable standards). It is the premise
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principle is prominent in statutory interpretation: By strictly construing
statutes 54 and granting no special deference to an agency's interpretation
of its enabling act,55 the Supreme Court has ensured that administrative
agencies work within the law rather than make it.56
Although the reach of the nondelegation doctrine has not been carefully
delimited, certain crucial choices must be made by elected representatives
in Congress.57 Where the federal government seeks to trespass on the
rights of states, 58 to encroach on constitutionally protected interests,59 or to
intrude on fundamental values,6 it must do so through the deliberative
processes of the legislature. In Kent v. Dulles,61 for example, the Court
held that the Secretary of State could not deny passports to persons be-
cause of their membership in the Communist Party. Refusing to reach the
constitutional issue, the Court determined that the individual's interest at
stake was so fundamental that it could be infringed only with explicit
congressional authorization: "Where activities or enjoyment, natural and
often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel,
are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail
or dilute them."862
The same principle, that only Congress may decide whether a person's
liberty should be restricted, has been applied to the determination of crim-
inal sanctions. The void-for-vagueness doctrine 3 and the rule of lenity 4
of this Note that where, as in the criminal law, those criteria have been established, the nondelegation
doctrine should be rigorously applied.
54. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)
(plurality opinion of Stevens, J.); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336,
342-43 (1974); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 106 S. Ct.
681, 686 (1986); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S.
89, 97 (1983); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Administrative experience . . . cannot he invoked to support action outside of the law. And what
action is, and what is not, within the law must be determined by courts.").
56. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1980); see also Gewirtz, supra note
53, at 65 ("A more modest and, in my view, preferable weapon in the service of the same constitu-
tional principle is available through statutory interpretation."); Stewart, The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1697 (1975) (advocating narrow construction of
statutory delegations as approach to solving nondelegation problem).
57. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61 (2d ed. 1986).
58. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971). In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court held that the procedural safeguards of the federal
political process, particularly the state's equal representation in the Senate, provided sufficient protec-
tion of state sovereign interests. The logic of Garcia, if not its precise holding, supports something like
a nondelegation doctrine when the federal government seeks to intrude on traditional state functions.
59. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 506-07 (1959).
60. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 93 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276-77 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
61. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
62. Id. at 129.
63. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 575 (1974); see also Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Sub-
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guard against executive lawmaking in the criminal law. 5 Although pri-
marily addressed to the substantive criminal law, both the rule of lenity
and the void-for-vagueness doctrine have constrained vague specifications
of criminal penalties. 6 Specifically, current jurisprudence prohibits the
executive from establishing the sanction for a criminal offense. Congress
itself may set sanctions for violations of administrative regulations and al-
low the agency to write the regulation,6 7 but an administrative agency
does not have the authority to prescribe criminal sanctions.6 8
The distinction between setting the penalty and determining the ele-
ments of the offense may appear formalistic. The executive might deter-
mine the sanction for a specific offense by directing the appropriate ad-
ministrative agency to promulgate a regulation making that conduct
illegal. The limited scope of any particular agency's mandate, however,
and the requirement that it base its decisions on reasons that derive from
that mandate," restricts the range of conduct it may subject to a sanction.
The executive may not, for example, direct the Securities and Exchange
Commission to make criminal the operation of a gambling enterprise or
any other activity outside its specific regulatory ambit. By preventing
agencies from determining the sanctions to be imposed for the violation of
their own regulations, the Court has implicitly required Congress to spec-
ify the relative severity of the violation of various agencies' rules.70
stance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1232 (1985) (viewing doctrine as reflecting principle of nondelega-
tion); Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1974) (suggesting
that doctrine is based on principles of legality and judicial review).
64. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952); see also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973)
(criminal stautes must be strictly construed); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95
(1820) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much
less old than construction itself. It is founded on ... the plain principle that the power of punishment
is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is
to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.").
65. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION 93-95 (1968).
66. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1978) (rule of lenity); United States v.
Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) (void-for-vagueness doctrine); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18
(1948) (same).
67. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
68. See United States v. Howard, 352 U.S. 212 (1957) (Congress must establish penalty); Avent
v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924) (same); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.6, at
113-14 (2d ed. 1986) (agencies permitted to determine sanctions over very narrow range). Compare
Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 241 (1943) ("One may be subjected to punishment for crime
in the federal courts only for the commission or omission of an act defined ... by regulation having
legislative authority, and then only if punishment is authorized by Congress.") with United States v.
Smull, 236 U.S. 405, 409 (1915) ("The false swearing is made a crime, not by the Department, but
by Congress; the statute, not the Department, fixes the penalty.").
69. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114 (1976) (administrative agency dedicated
to one purpose may not use other purposes to justify its actions).
70. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL oF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 109-15 (1965) (distinguish-
ing between power of license revocation, incident to regulation, and punishment, which is more diffi-
cult to measure); Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH.
U.L.Q. 265, 265.
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Similar constraints have been erected to cabin the discretion of the one
executive branch agency that arguably has authority over criminal sanc-
tions, the United States Attorney's Offices.71 Although the charge decision
indirectly affects the sentencing decision by determining whether a person
may be sentenced and the range within which that sentence must be im-
posed, 7 2 various institutions check the prosecutor's authority to unilater-
ally dictate a sentence. The prosecutor's charge decision must be approved
at the grand jury and preliminary hearing stages73 and must, of course, be
based on sufficient evidence to convict. A decision to reduce a charge al-
ready brought must be based on legitimate prosecutorial considerations. 7'
One might imagine separate statutes that imposed fixed sentences of dif-
ferent durations for the identical criminal conduct. In this situation, none
of the procedural safeguards would prevent the executive from determin-
ing the sentence imposed; the prosecutor's charge decision would effec-
tively determine the sentence imposed upon conviction. In rejecting a
nondelegation challenge to a prosecution under two statutes which made
the identical conduct criminal, however, the Court rested its decision on
the fact that the choice of statute under a system with no mandatory mini-
mums "does not empower the Government to predetermine ultimate crim-
inal sanctions. 71 5 Where the statutory structure did empower the govern-
ment to determine sanctions, then presumably the harsher statute would
be unconstitutional. 7
Moreover, the courts have prevented prosecutors from directly deter-
mining the sentence on a charge already brought. The sentencing judge
retains virtually unchecked authority to reject any plea bargain that, by
dismissing charges, limits the punishment that the court may impose.77 If
71. United States Attorneys have statutory authority to "prosecute all offenses against the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
72. See Bubany & Skillern, Taming the Dragon, 13 AM. 0tM. L. REv. 473, 480 (1976); Voren-
berg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1526 (1981) ("charge deci-
sion may have a major effect on the penalty"). It is well established that the decision of what charge to
bring rests in the prosecutor's discretion. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
73. See Vorenberg, supra note 72, at 1537.
74. See United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-13 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Am-
midown, 497 F.2d 615, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt & Neckwear
Contractors Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Professor Abraham Goldstein has noted that
although the structure for reviewing prosecutorial discretion is well established, "courts have been
curiously passive" in reviewing charge dismissals. A. GOLDSrEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 51
(1981).
75. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).
76. In a sense, the prosecutor's decision to prosecute a crime under a penalty-enhancing
mandatory minimum statute may predetermine the ultimate sanction. See Vorenberg, supra note 72,
at 1529-30. However, as the lower court noted in Batchelder, while Congress' decision to set different
penalties for legally distinguishable offenses results in a constitutionally unavoidable delegation to the
prosecutor, it does not in any way constitute a failure of the legislature to set sanctions. United States
v. Batchelder, 587 F.2d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
77. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (e)(2), (4); see also United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 835 (5th
1372
Vol. 96: 1363, 1987
U.S. Sentencing Commission
it will result in too light a sentence for the defendant or otherwise intrude
on the judicial sentencing function, the court may reject a plea bargain
that drops charges78 or specifies a sentence to be imposed.7 9 By exercising
independent sentencing authority, the court prevents the sentencing deci-
sion from being delegated to those "whose temperment [is] shaped by their
adversar[ial] duties."'80
B. The Parole Commission Example
The United States Parole Commission illustrates the operation of the
separation of powers in the criminal law. An independent agency in the
Department of Justice,81 the Parole Commission has jurisdiction over pa-
role decisions for all persons imprisoned for violating the federal criminal
code.82 To promote uniformity in prison terms for offenders convicted of
similar crimes, the Commission has since 1973 used guidelines which em-
phasize current offense and criminal history and which provided the
model for the sentencing guidelines system. 83
In upholding the constitutionality of the Parole Commission's release
decisions, the courts have emphasized the following point: The release de-
cision must be within both the broad ranges allowed by statute and also,
crucially, the smaller ranges set by the judicially imposed sentence.8
While the Parole Commission has repeatedly changed the sanctions at-
tached to particular offenses to reflect the values and law enforcement pri-
orities of an incumbent administration,85 it may not incarcerate a person
Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (discretion to reject plea bargain as broad as discretion to impose sentence); In
re Yielding, 599 F.2d 251, 252 (8th Cir. 1979) ("no court should be compelled to permit any plea
negotiations at all"); United States v. Stamey, 569 F.2d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1978) (district judge need
not even consider plea bargain). The judicial power to reject plea bargains is mandated by the separa-
tion of powers. Comment, Judicial Discretion To Reject Negotiated Pleas, 63 GEo. L.J. 241, 253
(1974),
78. See, e.g., United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Escobar
Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Munroe, 493 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). For a discussion of
effective sentencing power in plea bargaining situations, concluding that judges exercise the para-
mount power in most of the cases, see Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
733, 745-76 (1980).
80. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059,
1065 (1976).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1982).
82. Id. § 4201.
83. See P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, supra note 28, at 65; 1 RESEARCH ON
SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 21.
84. See Artez v. Mulcrone, 673 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1982) (rejecting claim of unconstitutional
delegation of sentencing power); Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); see also
Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1212 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The Commission
may not require a prisoner to spend a single day in prison longer than his judicial sentence dictates
.... "), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984).
85. See President Exerts Pressure on Parole Commission, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 18, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
In January 1983, the Commission, under new leadership, doubled the minimum period of incarcera-
1373
The Yale Law Journal
for a longer period than the trial judge has determined is appropriate after
hearing the defendant's case. 86 Necessarily, therefore, the Parole Commis-
sion's decisions are constrained by the strategies and decisions of the judge
and prosecutor.8 7
C. The Unconstitutionality of the Commission
The Sentencing Commission intrudes into an area where decisions must
be made through the deliberative processes of Congress. Every one of its
guidelines, all of which go into effect unless Congress passes and the Pres-
ident signs an act to the contrary,88 will reflect the type of substantive
moral judgment that has traditionally been reserved for Congress. The
Commission's most recent set of guidelines, for example, departed signifi-
candy from past sentencing practice in requiring terms of imprisonment
for persons convicted of price-fixing under the antitrust laws or paying a
gratuity to an elected official.89 If the Justice Department interpretation is
followed, the Commission may be able to decide both whether the death
penalty should be restored and the crimes for which it should be
imposed."'
As with the United States Parole Commission, Congress created the
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency. Despite this effort to
insulate the Commission from constitutional challenge,91 however, neither
the Commission's "independent" status nor its formal placement in the
judiciary92  saves it from constitutional attack. Independent status,
whatever its current viability in other respects,9" is irrelevant to nondele-
tion for offenders convicted of drug and espionage crimes. See Administration Issues Tougher Parole
Guidelines, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1983, at A16, col. 1. See generally Singer, In Favor of "Presump-
tive Sentences" Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 401, 417 n.20 (1978) (noting
changes in parole guidelines from 1972 to 1977).
86. An inmate may not be released until she has served a portion of her judicially imposed sen-
tence, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982), and must be released at the expiration of her sentence, less good
time she has earned. Id. § 4164. Although the Parole Commission's discretion is thus bounded, it too
has been subject to criticism. See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process,
84 YALE L.J. 810, 888 (1975) ("[Bloth the choice of goals and their relevance to particular forms of
criminal behavior are decisions more appropriately made by legislative . . . bodies.").
87. See Schulhofer, supra note 79, at 747.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (Supp. III 1985).
89. APRIL 1987 GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at 2.29, 2.105.
90. See supra note 21.
91. The House of Representatives recognized that "any suggestion that the Executive Branch
should be responsible for promulgating the guidelines would present troubling constitutional
problems." H. R. REP. No. 1017, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1984).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. 111 1985).
93. The Court's former distinction between independent and executive agencies, see Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), has been eviscerated for most purposes, see, e.g., INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.16 (1984) (independent commission exercises executive power for
purposes of legislative veto analysis), and commentators agree that the two types of agencies differ
neither in their place in government nor in their responsibilities. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 573 (1984); Note,
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gation analysis."' Moreover, though judiciary branch status might be rele-
vant to a nondelegation challenge, 5 the Court has held that statutory des-
ignation is not dispositive in a separation of powers inquiry. 8 In light of
the Commission's power to promulgate regulations97 and the President's
authority over its members,9 the majority of whom have no connection to
the judiciary other than their service on the Commission, to claim that the
Commission is in the judiciary rather than the executive branch is simply
not colorable.
Unlike the Parole Commission, the Sentencing Commission's power
will likely not be limited by the judicial imposition of a sentence. The
Sentencing Commission's guidelines are mandatory.99 Although judges
may voice disagreement with the guidelines through letters to the Sentenc-
ing Commission,100 the Commission's decision as to whether a factor is
important in sentencing is final,'" and judges must adhere to it in impos-
ing sentence. Only if the standards for departure and appellate review are
stretched to make the guidelines into presumptive recommendations can
the nondelegation challenge be met.102
The provision that the guidelines remain before Congress for 180 days
Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985).
94. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1974)
(narrowly construing delegation to independent agency to avoid nondelegation problem).
95. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 277 & n.33 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(congressional delegation of rulemaking power to judiciary virtually unique for its lack of standards).
Even if the Commission were in the judicial branch, the promulgation of sentencing guidelines might
still exceed the powers that may be constitutionally exercised by article III judges. See infra text
accompanying notes 171-80.
96. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 586-87
(1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 459 (1929); see also Ameron,
Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 883 (3d Cir.) ("Instead of 'decision by
label,' we must focus on function and reality."), aft'd as modified, 809 F.2d 979 (1986). But see id. at
892-93 (Becker, J., concurring in part) ("Comptroller General's status within the government is a
matter of statutory interpretation which, like all statutory interpretation, is controlled by legislative
intent.").
97. Congressional agencies may not promulgate regulations binding persons outside the legisla-
ture. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 130 (1976); see also Justice Department Memorandum, supra
note 21 (Commission is in executive branch).
98. The Court has indicated that officers who are appointed and removable by the President are
not part of the judicial branch. See Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections v. United States Marshals
Serv., 106 S. Ct. 355, 358 n.1 (1986); see also Northern Constr. Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (distinguishing between magistrates appointed
by district court judges and bankruptcy judges appointed by President); Chandler v. Judicial Council
of the Tenth Circuit, 378 U.S. 74, 97-103 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing constitutional
importance of judicial control of Administrative Office of United States Courts and Judicial Confer-
ence); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3191 (1986) (officer removable by Congress in legisla-
tive branch).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
100. See S. REP. No. 223, supra note 22, at 76.
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (Supp. III 1985) (court may depart from guidelines only for factor
not adequately considered by Commission).
102. See supra note 45.
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before they take effect does not save the Commission.1 3 Congressional
oversight does not turn administratively promulgated rules into legislation
or cure a delegation that is too broad.104 The Supreme Court has held
that Congress may act only through legislation passed by the two houses
and signed by the President.1 05 Even when Congress has held hearings on
an administrative practice or has long been aware of it, the Court will not
attribute significance to congressional inaction or acquiescence.10 6 Because
there are numerous reasons why Congress might be silent,107 the absence
of repeal cannot be taken as the constitutional equivalent of an affirmation
of an administrative proposal.
III. JUDICIAL MEMBERSHIP AND THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
Congress' effort to cloak the Commission's activities in judicial robes,
simply by placing judges on it, constitutes a deeper flaw in its constitu-
tionality. The judiciary in our tripartite system is limited to deciding
"cases" and "controversies" and exercising those non-adjudicative admin-
istrative powers that are essential to the running of the courts. The au-
thority that the Commission possesses to implement final binding action
on a matter outside the peculiar interests of the judiciary, and its mixed
composition of judges and other presidential appointees renders the Com-
mission unconstitutional.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (Supp. III 1985).
104. See Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 467 n.172 (D.C. Cir. 1982), afJ'd
sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 126 (1984).
105. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n.23 (1984) ("To allow Congress to evade the stric-
tures of the Constitution and in effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be
squared with Art. I.").
106. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.1 1 (1980); cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 600 (1983) ("Ordinarily and quite appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to
the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation."). But cf. Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, 55 U.S.L.W. 4379, 4387 n.7 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1987) (congressional inaction may
constitute acquiescence where no legislation proposed in face of conspicuous judicial ruling). Only
where Congress reenacts a statute with knowledge of a prior administrative or judicial interpretation
of the statute, does its affirmative action presumptively indicate approval of that interpretation and
enact it into law. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 382 & n.66
(1982); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975); see also Lindahl v. Office of
Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 782 & n.15 (1985) (amendment of section of statute with
knowledge of administrative interpretation of unamended subsection ratifies such interpretation).
107. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 (1940) ("To explain the cause of non-action
by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into speculative unrealities."); H. Hart
& A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1395-96 (tent. ed. 1958) (listing reasons for congressional inaction);




A. The Case and Controversy Requirement and the Modern Judiciary
By its terms, the Constitution limits the judiciary to the decision of
cases and controversies. 10 8 Along with the "compensation" and "good be-
havior" clauses, 09 the case and controversy requirement reflects a com-
mitment to the principle of judicial independence.1 10 As Alexander Ham-
ilton argued, "the interpretation of the laws is the proper and regular
province of the courts," and "liberty would have everything to fear from
[the judiciary's] union with either of the other departments." ' 1
The realities of administration of the modern judiciary preclude any
contention that judges are limited to mere "bench-sitting."112 Judges today
promulgate rules of court procedure, 1 " assign other judges to hear
cases,11 4 and perform various internal disciplinary functions.11 5 Moreover,
108. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
109. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1. The two clauses share the common purpose with the case and
controversy requirement of preserving judicial independence. See Northern Constr. Pipeline Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 n.10 (1982) ("the independence that [the clauses] guarantee
helps to promote public confidence in judicial determinations"); see also United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980) ("A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by
other branches of government.").
110. The limitation of the judiciary to cases and controversies is implicit in the separation of
powers. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947); see also Varat, Cases and Controversies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 218, 219 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1986) (limitation "reinforces [judges']
ability to resist nonjudicial tasks pressed on them by others").
111. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504, 506 (A. Hamilton) (Modern Library ed.).
112. In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial
Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3273
(1986) [hereinafter Matter of Certain Complaints]. See generally Meador, The Federal Judiciary
and its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979) (discussing administrative structure of
federal judicial system).
113. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3772 (1982) 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2076 (1982). For discussion of the
federal courts' rulemaking authority, see W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POS-
SIBILmIFS (1981); J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES (1977); Burbank,
The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). The rulemaking power is dele-
gated to the judiciary under Congress' power to regulate the courts. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825).
114. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1982) (assignment of circuit court judges to hear cases); id. § 292
(assignment of district court judges to hear cases); 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (1982) (Chief Justice to
designate district judges to sit as court to hear applications for surveillance warrants). The constitu-
tionality of the Chief Justice's power to assign district judges from one circuit to hear cases in circuit
was upheld in Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 118 (1916).
115. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (Judicial Coun-
cils and Judicial Conference); Matter of Certain Complaints, supra note 112 (Judicial Councils Re-
form and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980); see also Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Inde-
pendence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979) (discussing judiciary's internal disciplinary functions); Note,
Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct Act of 1980, 94
YALE L.J. 1117 (1985) (same). In addition, the judiciary advises Congress and the President on
matters relating to the administration of justice. See, e.g., Cannon & Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation
in Improving the Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1
(1981).
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under article II of the Constitution, the "Courts of Law" may be assigned
the power to appoint inferior federal officers. 1 '
Rather, the case and controversy requirement and the principle of judi-
cial independence it reflects forbids judges from making rules outside the
case and controversy context on matters external to the administration of
justice or from entering a formal working relationship with members of
the other branches of government. At the Constitutional Convention, the
Framers rejected two proposals that would have combined justices of the
Supreme Court with members of the Executive Branch. The Council of
Revision, on which "a convenient number of the national judiciary1117
were to have served, would have exercised a veto over legislation, and the
Council of State, of which the Chief Justice was to be a member, would
have advised the President much as the Cabinet does today." 8 Despite
support from such luminaries as Wilson and Madison, the proposal for a
Council of Revision was overwhelmingly defeated. The Framers objected
that it would establish "an improper coalition between the Executive and
Judiciary."" 9 That decision, rather than the Convention's failure to ex-
116. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Judges have been vested with the power to appoint independent
counsel, 28 U.S.C.A. § 593 (West Supp. 1986), acting United States Attorneys, 28 U.S.C.A. § 546(d)
(West Supp. 1987), probation officers, 18 U.S.C. § 3654 (1982), and federal public defenders, id. §
3006A(h)(2)(A). Although the view that the appointment power is limited to "the department of the
government to which the officer to be appointed most appropriately belong(s]," Ex parte Hennen, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 225, 258 (1839), has been rejected, see Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), the
Court has held that the appointment power may not be "incongruous" with the judicial function. Id.
at 397-98; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 914-15 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court)
(appointment power may not be "incongruous" or destructive of "guarantees of personal liberty").
This circumscribed authority to supervise non-judicial officers does not warrant a broad exception to
the case and controversy requirement. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398; see also INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 946 (1984) (strictly construing constitutional provisions mixing powers); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (same). The appointment power does not extend to authority
to supervise officers, see Hobson, 265 F. Supp. at 914-15, and might not extend to expanding an
independent counsel's jurisdiction or otherwise engaging in an investigation. Cf Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979) (violation of judicial neutrality for judge to join police officers in
conducting search).
117. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (1911).
118. 2 id. at 335. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 7-8 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM]; 2 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 1017 (1953) (same).
119. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 117, at 75 (statement of E. Gerry); The Council of Revision
was discussed on the floor of the Convention and was much criticized. See, e.g., id. at 298 (statement
of C. Pinckney against Council of Revision) ("[Ilt will involve [judges] in parties, and give a previous
tincture to their opinions."); 1 id. at 97-98 (statement of R. King) ("Judges ought to be able to
expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its
formation."); The Council of State, first proposed on August 20, 1787, see 2 id. at 335, never emerged
from the Committee of Detail. For discussion of the implications of the rejection of the Council of
Revision and Council of State, see C.E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 27
(1928) (rejection of Council of Revision permitted Court to withstand attack that could have been
destructive of its authority); Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SuP. CT.




plicitly bar dual-holding by judges, 120 set the tempo for future considera-
tion of the constitutional limitations on activities that may be assigned
judges.
In 1793, the Justices of the Jay Court responded to an inquiry by
Thomas Jefferson whether the judiciary would make itself available to
advise the executive on legal questions, by stating that "the lines of sepa-
ration between the three departments of the government" forbade the ju-
diciary from extrajudicially advising the president.121 As Felix Frank-
furter noted, such an activity would have "involve[d] the judges too
intimately in the process of policy and thereby weaken[ed] confidence in
the disinterestedness of their judicatory functions." '122
Concurrently, five Justices of the Supreme Court sitting as circuit jus-
tices refused to make pension determination subject to revision by the De-
partment of War.1 23 The statute's assignment of jurisdiction to the circuit
courts, all the judges agreed, constituted an unconstitutional request for
courts to perform extrajudicial functions.124 Justice Wilson stated, "It is a
120. A motion barring Supreme Court Justices from holding "any other office of trust or emolu-
ment under the United States or an individual state" was introduced at the Constitutional Convention
and referred without discussion to the Committee of Detail from which it was never reported. Slonim,
Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of the Separation of Powers, 49 CONN. B.J. 391, 401
(1975); see also Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV.
123, 129 (discussing motion at Convention and similar proposal in 1800). The failure of this proposal,
the reasons for which are now lost to history, cannot provide affirmative constitutional warrant for the
exercise of extrajudicial duties. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 n.16 (1974); Tribe,
Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Si-
lence, 57 IND. L.J. 515, 553 (1982).
121. See Letter from Chief Justice Jay to President Washington, reprinted in THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, supra note 118, at 65. The Justices wrote, "[The branches of
government] being in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the
last resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extrajudi-
cially deciding the questions alluded to . . . ." Id. Russell Wheeler has observed that the Justices'
letter constituted a rejection on constitutional grounds of a permanent position for judges as advisors to
the executive. Wheeler, supra note 120, at 149-55.
122. Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 476, 478
(1930); see also Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1002, 1007 (1924)
("[T]he burden of decision ought not to be shifted to the tribunal whose task is the most delicate in
our whole scheme of government.").
123. The opinions of the five Justices and three district judges, expressed in letters to President
Washington, are reported at Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 app. (1794). The 1792 Act re-
quired the circuit courts to examine the nature of wounds incurred in the Revolutionary War and
recommend a pension that would be "just." If the Secretary of War suspected error, however, he
could reverse the judges' recommendations. See Wheeler, supra note 120, at 135-38 (discussing con-
text and holding of Hayburn's Case).
124. Although the judges in Hayburn's Case held that the circuit courts could not exercise extra-
judicial power as courts, three of the judges agreed to certify pension funds in their personal capacity.
The judges' exercise of that power was successfully challenged in United States v. Yale Todd (1794),
notes printed in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 app. (1851). Although there is
no surviving opinion in Yale Todd, some have argued that its holding, that judges may not personally
exercise extrajudicial powers, was based on constitutional grounds. See In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222,
225 (1893); D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1985). Perhaps signifi-
cantly, Justice Iredell, who did hear the pension claims, felt compelled to write, "If therefore it ap-
peared to me that this question could by any possibility come before me as Judge. . .I ought not to
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principle important to freedom that the judicial should be distinct from,
and independent of, the legislative department." 125
Concern with these twin matters-the creation of a formal relationship
between article III judges and members of the other branches and the
assignment to judges of authority to legislate on matters outside the partic-
ular concern of the judiciary-has continued to the present day. Congress
still may not require courts to render decisions that will be subject to leg-
islative revision-an activity in which judges and legislators act as part-
ners;12 and its power to permit article III judges to serve on legislative
courts has been closely questioned.1 7 Congress' decision to reconstitute
the Court of Claims as an article III court, for example, reflected in part
a belated realization that it would be unconstitutional for article III judges
to serve on a non-article III body.1 28
Moreover, in considering the constitutionality of such nonadjudicatory
functions as the disciplinary activities of the Judicial Conference under
the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
19801.2 and the rulemaking power of the courts under the Rules Enabling
Act, 30 the courts have drawn a distinction between matters "ancillary to
the administration of the courts"" 1 and matters "lying outside the imme-
diate concerns of the judicial branch. 132 The judiciary may promulgate
and enforce rules to "put its own house in order"1 3; indeed, the place-
exercise the authority." J. Iredell, Reasons for Acting as a Commissioner on the Invalid Act (Oct.
1792), quoted in M. Marcus & E. Van Tassel, A mear Matter of Bargain: Judges and Legislators in
the New Federal System, 1789-1800, at 18 (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
125. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 411 app.
126. See C. & S. Airlines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1948); United States v.
Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
127. See National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 640 (1949) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 561 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (discussing uncertainty over whether judges can sit
on art. I courts).
128. See H. R. REP. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2006. So long as they do not actually sit with non-article III judges, federal
judges may be assigned to sit on legislative courts. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1424(b)(a) (1982) (district
court of Guam); id. § 1614 (a) (district court of Virgin Islands); cf. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205, 266 (1985) (fed-
eral judges have never been paired on panels with state court judges).
129. Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 332, 372(b), 604
(1982)).
130. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2076 (1982). For discussion of the court's rulemaking power, see supra
note 113; infra notes 133-35.
131. Matter of Certain Complaints, supra note 112, at 1505; see also Chandler v. Judicial Coun-
cil of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Circuit Judicial Council
may make rules "reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding function of the courts of
appeals").
132. Matter of Certain Complaints, supra note 112, at 1504.
133. Chandler, 398 U.S. at 85; see J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 54 ("[A] crucial part of [the
judiciary's] independence lies in a power to formulate the rules by which cases are to be litigated and
processed."); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 1022 (1924)
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ment of that authority outside the judiciary might be disruptive of the
judiciary's independence.134  However, it may not engage in non-
adjudicatory behavior that is substantive in nature. 3
B. Constitutional History and the Activities of Individual Judges
Drawing on history, several commentators have suggested that judges
may perform extrajudicial functions as individuals that they could not
perform as judges.' 36 There is a long tradition of justices participating in
(Courts "must, therefore, be invested with incidental powers of self-protection."). The Jay Court may
have recognized this distinction. Though it refused to advise President Washington on the construction
of foreign treaties, see supra text accompanying note 121, it did write him about the duties of judges
riding on circuit. See Eisenberg, A Consideration of Extra-Judicial Activities in the Pre-Marshall
Court Era, 1985 YEARBOOK SUPREME CT. Hisr. Soc'y 117, 119; Wheeler, supra note 120, at 148.
134. See Matter of Certain Complaints, supra note 112, at 1506; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J.
240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 414 (courts' rulemaking power not subject to overriding legislation), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); Meador, supra note 112, at 1046; Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for
Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL- L. REV. 276 (1928).
135. See Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 861, 865-66 (1963)
(Court may only promulgate rules that address "housekeeping details"); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (rulemaking power limited to rules that "really regulate procedure"); id. at 18
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[A] drastic change in public policy in a matter deeply touching the
sensibilities of people. . . ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for
the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of the federal courts."); Hastings
v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) ("While it is unquestioned that Congress has the power to establish (or authorize the
judiciary to establish) purely administrative, 'housekeeping' procedures-such as procedures for man-
aging dockets and assigning cases-that authority does not necessarily extend beyond such administra-
tive matters."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 558 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (W.D. Va. 1983); Beale,
Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1468 (1984); Landers, Of Legalized
Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 854 (1974) (constitutional limitations on delegating rulemaking power coexten-
sive with Rules Enabling Act). It is perhaps significant that under 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1982) only
Congress, and not the Court through its rulemaking procedures, can change a rule of privilege.
Although the procedure-substance distinction may not capture the effect of rules on the outcome of
litigation, see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965), it does express an important differ-
ence in institutional capacity. Procedural rules are designed to make the litigation process itself fair
and efficient, see Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 724 (1978), and have
never needed a statutory basis. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 24-33 (inherent court rulemak-
ing power existed at common law); Pound, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599,
601 (1926) (same). A comparable distinction has been made with respect to Congress' power to hold
witnesses in contempt. The congressional need to be informed makes the congressional right to hold
persons in contempt a necessary "auxiliary . . . in aid of the legislative function." McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1926). The exercise of non-legislative powers "incidental to the legis-
lative function," id. at 160-61, however, "cannot be inflated into a general power to expose" where
Congress is not acting "in furtherance of a legislative purpose." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 200-01 (1957); see In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1881); see also Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J. 836, 855 & n.93
(1987) (discussing contempt power). For an argument that the judiciary should retain control over
judicial practice and a discussion of the difficulties of characterizing matters as procedural or substan-
tive, see Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Consti-
tutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958).
136. See Slonim, supra note 120; see also In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Sub-
poena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986) (history indicates that judges may engage in extrajudi-
cial governmental activities); In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scaduto,
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executive branch activities. In the early days of the country, several Jus-
tices performed foreign affairs functions on behalf of the executive137 ;
more recently, judges have served as international arbiters and members of
presidential commissions. 138
The argument from past practice, however, renders an incomplete his-
torical account. The early practice of the Supreme Court Justices reflected
a complex understanding of the constitutional restrictions: Whereas infor-
mal advice-giving was constitutional, actual participation in legislative re-
vision was not.'39 Even the early extrajudicially active Justices recognized
boundaries to extrajudicial commitments, declining positions that might
have compromised their independence. 40 John Jay felt that a judge could
undertake extrajudicial activity as long as it was "consistent and compati-
ble with" the judicial function.' 4 ' John Marshall stepped down from his
position as Secretary of State when appointed to the bench, agreeing to
perform the duties of the office only until a replacement could be found. 4 2
Moreover, the Justices persistently refused to accept remuneration for
performing extrajudicial governmental functions. 43 Indeed, the assump-
763 F.2d 1191, 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985) (Roney, J., concurring specially) (same).
137. Frequently cited examples are Chief Justice John Jay's service as Secretary of State and as
an emissary to England, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth's service as Minister to France, and Chief
Justice John Marshall's service as Secretary of State. See Scarfo, 783 F.2d at 377; see also Wheeler,
supra note 120 (listing activities).
138. Justices Nelson, Fuller, and Brewer served on arbitral tribunals in the late nineteenth cen-
tury; Justice Owen Roberts on the Pearl Harbor Commission; Chief Justice Warren on the Commis-
sion investigating the assassination of President Kennedy; and Justice Jackson as a prosecutor at the
Nuremberg War Crimes tribunal. See Scarfo, 783 F.2d at 377. For exhaustive listings of the extraju-
dicial commitments of Supreme Court Justices, see REPORT ON THE USE OF JUDGES IN NON-
JUDICIAL OFFICES IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in Independence of Judges: Should They Be Used for Non-Judicial Work?, 33 A.B.A. J.
792, 795 (1947) [hereinafter S. ExEc. REP. No. 7] (listing commissions on which judges have served);
B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 345-63 (1982); McKay, The Judiciary
and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 27 (1969).
139. See Wheeler, supra note 120, at 145 & n.101.
140. See Eisenberg, supra note 133, at 125 (suggesting that early Supreme Court Justices bal-
anced harm to article III values against general governmental interests in deciding whether to assume
extrajudicial responsibilities).
141. See Wheeler, supra note 120, at 131.
142. See 2 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 558-59 (1929); R. Wheeler, Extraju-
dicial Activites of United States Supreme Court Justices: The Constitutional Period, 1790-1809, at
226-27 1970 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago).
143. See W. Cibes, Extra-Judicial Activities of Justices of the United States Supreme Court,
1790-1960, at 179 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Univ.) (Chief Justice Marshall
did not accept extra salary for performing functions of Secretary of State), 212 (judges who were
members of Sinking Fund Commission did not receive extra salary), 212 n.60 (neither Justice John-
son nor Justice Ellsworth received extra pay for their extrajudicial service). But see 22 Op. Att'y Gen.
184 (1898) (opining that judges can receive stipend for extrajudicial service). Too much should not be
made of the other examples of extrajudicial activity. Jay's service as acting Secretary of State, a posi-
tion that followed from his activity as Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, lasted for only three months and came during a term when the Supreme Court met for only ten
days and did not hear any cases. See F. MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY 306 (1935).
His appointment as emissary to Great Britain in 1794 elicited a resolution that extrajudicial service
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tion of extrajudicial responsibilities by judges has long elicited controversy
among judges""' as well as legislators.145
The practice of judges performing extrajudicial activites is thus not
nearly as "unbroken" and "systematic,"1 ' as would be necessary to sup-
port the implication of a constitutional norm.14 7 Indeed, the argument gets
the principle exactly backwards. The only significant difference between
assigning a duty to a judge as an individual and as a member of a court is
that as an individual she will be acting outside the judiciary. 4 But by
was "contrary to the spirit of the Constitution" and may have been ratified only because of specula-
tion that he would resign from his judicial post. See J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO
1801, at 747 (1971) (Holmes Devise); I C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 119 (1922). His successor Ellsworth only reluctantly accepted the position as envoy ex-
traordinaire to France and his appointment was opposed on constitutional grounds by Jefferson,
Madison, and Charles Pinckney. C. WARREN, supra, at 167.
144. See, e.g., Mason, Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: The Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1953). Many of the Justices who have undertaken extrajudicial activity have
done so despite constitutional qualms, see, e.g., In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Sub-
poena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 377-78 (3d Cir. 1986) (describing Chief Justice Warren's reluctance
to head Warren Commission), and have later regretted their service. See Roberts, Now Is the Time:
Fortif/ing the Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.A. J. 1, 2 (1949) (suggesting that no Justice or
judge hold "any other governmental or public office or position"); The Association and the Supreme
Court, 32 A.B.A. J. 862-63 (1946) (Justice Jackson regretted participating in extrajudicial activities).
See generally Comment, Separation of Powers and Judicial Service on Presidential Commissions, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 993, 998-99 (1986) (many judges have refused extrajudicial service).
145. "The whole independence and integrity of judicial office must at least be embarassed, if not
compromised, by the easy flow from bench to political office. Yet this is where the practice of ap-
pointing judges to Executive offices tends to lead." S. ExEC. REP. No. 7, supra note 138, at 793; see
also S. 1097, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court
Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1969) (enforcing "principle of separation
of powers" by prohibiting exercise by judges "of nonjudicial governmental powers and duties"); 10
ANNAlS OF CONG. 97-98 (1800) (statement of Rep. Pinckney) ("[Iun vain will we consider [judges]
independent. . . until we have determined that it shall not be in [the President's] power to give them
additional offices and emoluments . . ").
146. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
147. The Court regularly rejects the controlling effect of custom, compare INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[O]ur inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that congressional
veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to execu-
tive and independent agencies ....") and id. at 968-74 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing historical
use of legislative veto) with Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 509-10 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that claim of executive privilege dismissed by Court has been prac-
tice of Presidents since George Washington), save perhaps where it is "unbroken" and "has prevailed
almost from the inception of the national government." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (practice must be "long pursued" and "never before questioned"); United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474-75 (1915) (longstanding practice of Presidents, acquiesced in by
Congress and not interfering with any vested rights, operates as an implied grant of power). See
generally Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REV.
109, 121 (1984) (relying on custom "equates what is with what ought to be and regards patterns of
practice as principles of law"). As the Supreme Court has never decided the propriety of extrajudicial
service, it is arguable that the judiciary has never acquiesced in the practice.
148. The irrelevance of the term "court" to article III restrictions on extrajudicial activities is
aptly demonstrated by the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. § 593 (1982). Although the Constitu-
tion only allows Congress to place the appointment power in the "Courts of Law," the three judges
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rendering constitutional otherwise unconstitutional behavior if performed
in another branch of government, this principle would sacrifice both indi-
vidual judicial independence and the interest of the judiciary as a whole in
the control of its members.
Virtually every state court and legislature"4 9 has found that a judge's
occupation of an office in another department of government or perform-
ance of functions that could compromise her judicial impartiality violates
either specific constitutional prohibitions' 50 or separation of powers. 5 ' Al-
though the judge who is appointed to the bench from an executive or leg-
islative office may bring her own prejudices with her, 5 2 concurrent par-
ticipation in policymaking threatens the judge's ability to make an
independent judicial decision, 153 accords the political decision of an ad-
ministrative agency a presumptive legality that it might not otherwise
who actually appoint an independent counsel under the Act are convened solely for that purpose and
do not exist independently as a court. See id. If the three judges who appoint the independent counsel
must be considered a "court," so should the three judges who sit on the Sentencing Commission.
149. For a discussion of the role of state law as a source of federal constitutional norms, see Utter,
Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues when
Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1025, 1040 (1985) ("[Sltate
courts have made vast contributions to the growth of federal constitutional law.").
150. See Abbott v. McNutt, 218 Cal. 225, 22 P.2d 510 (1933) (membership of two judges on five-
judge qualification board nominating candidates for chief executive violates separation of powers);
State ex rel. White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 109, 89 N.W. 204, 208 (1902) (appointment of members
of utility board); Local 170 v. Gadola, 322 Mich. 332, 34 N.W.2d 71 (1948) (one judge on three-
member arbitration board); State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Armstrong, 91 Miss. 513, 44 So. 809 (1907)
(mayor of city); In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 414-15, 160 N.E. 655, 657-58 (1928) (appointment
as special investigator for governor); State ex rel. Young v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N.W. 639
(1907) (appointment of members of board of control); IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 18; MONT. CoNsr. art.
VII, § 9(3); W. VA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 7; N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 20. Under New York's elaborate
standards, a judge is prohibited from assuming a position that is not "transient, occasional, or inciden-
tal" to the judicial function. People v. Nichols, 52 N.Y. 478, 485, 11 Am. Rep. 734, 740 (1873).
151. The proposition that judicial participation in extrajudicial activities is barred by the separa-
tion of powers is supported by two eminent jurists. See In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. at 410-11, 160
N.E. at 657-58 (Cardozo, J.) ("From the beginnings of our history, the principle has been enforced
that there is no inherent power in Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative
duties except where reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties."); Dasm v. Van Kleeck,
7 Johns. 477, 508, 5 Am. Dec. 291, 313 (N.Y. 1811) (Kent, C.) ("[If [the provision that the legisla-
tive and judicial powers shall be preserved separate and distinct] be not found in our own constitution,
in terms, it exists there in substance."); see also People v. Bott, 261 Ill. App. 261 (1931) (position of
town clerk incompatible with judicial position); In re Nelson, 163 N.W.2d 533 (S.D. 1968) (single
judge on seven-member mediation board); Conklin, Plural Office Holding, 28 OR. L. REV. 332, 356
(1949) ("The separation of powers of government into different departments itself makes inconsistent
the holding of offices in different departments by the same person."); Note, Extrajudicial Activities of
Judges, 47 IOWA L. REV. 1025 (1962) (discussing state constitutional limitations on governmental
activities of judges).
152. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
153. See Note, Extrajudicial Activity of Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 594
(1970) ("Justices who have advised the President or Congress on a 'correct' course of action will find
it difficult to strike down the action they recommended as illegal or unconstitutional if the action is
challenged in Court."); see also Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914, 951-52 (1976) (discussing Judge Clark's difficulty in dissociating his
decisions on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from his work in creating them).
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merit,154 and, by occupying much of a judge's time, impairs the judiciary's
ability to perform its constitutionally assigned functions. 155
C. Judicial Participation on the Sentencing Commission
These twin concepts-that judges may not enter into a formal working
relationship with members of the other branches or exercise rulemaking
power on matters that are not ancillary to the judicial process-give con-
tent to the Supreme Court's dicta that "executive or administrative duties
of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on [article III] judges." '156
Under these principles, the Sentencing Commission violates the separation
of powers.
The union of the judiciary and the executive that the Sentencing Com-
mission creates gives the executive a power considered among the more
pernicious: the power to control the responsibilities of sitting judges. For
most of constitutional history, a judge assigned to a particular circuit was
required to reside in that circuit and could not be reassigned.157 Although
the immobile judiciary did not survive the 1922 creation of the Judicial
Conference, the power of reassignment has always been placed within the
judiciary.15 The potential that certain assignments would be granted as
political favors and that others would be used to dictate outcomes fueled
the concern that the Chief Justice felt about his own power of assign-
ment,1 59 as well as the common assumption that the power could not be
placed outside the judiciary.18 ° Under the Sentencing Reform Act, how-
154. As one commentator has noted, "By recommending a law, a judge puts his stamp of approval
on it and in effect renders an opinion that it is constitutional or legal." Comment, supra note 144, at
1013. Fear of the effect that the judicial imprimatur might have on subsequent judicial review was the
basis of the attack on judicial rulemaking by Justices Douglas, Black, and Frankfurter. See Statement
of Mr. Justice Douglas, 409 U.S, 1132 (1973); Statement of Mr. Justice Douglas, 383 U.S. 1089
(1966); Statement of Mr. Justice Black, 383 U.S. 1032 (1966); Statement of Mr. Justice Black and
Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 861, 865 (1963); Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 323 U.S.
821, 822 (1944). But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("[The court has been in-
structed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses
neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions."). For discussion of judicial
rulemaking, see supra text accompanying notes 113, 133-35.
155. See, e.g., Note, supra note 153, at 596-97.
156. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976).
157. P. FIsH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 14-17 (1973); F. FRANK-
FURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 218-19 (1928).
158. See statutes cited supra note 114.
159. In 1920, Chief Justice Edward Douglas White opposed a Justice Department proposal to
expand his power to assign lower court judges to particular circuits because of "the possible harm
which might come to the whole system . . . ." P. FISH, supra note 157, at 16 (quoting Letter from
White to Arthur C. Denison (Feb. 9, 1920)). White's successors, Chief Justices Taft and Hughes,
were also wary of the possibility that the assignment power would be used for political purposes.
Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System: 1922-1947, 31 F.R.D. 307, 338-39
(1963).
160. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 157, at 242 ("The judiciary like most other
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ever, the executive branch chooses the judges who then are excused from
their responsibilities to reside in their districts and are required to serve
full-time on the Commission."' Not only does the provision that the Pres-
ident appoint at least three judges to the Commission provide him a vehi-
cle for virtually the first time162 through which he can determine the as-
signments of sitting judges, but the composition of the Commission is such
that the four non-judicial presidential appointees at any one time may be
able to determine whether the judges on the Commission should be sum-
moned to Washington or allowed to stay in their courtrooms.
Moreover, the Sentencing Commission effects a permanent collaborative
relationship between the judiciary and executive that violates the norm of
judicial independence. Service on the Commission is not merely transient.
Although the statutory requirement that at least three article III judges
serve on the Commission may not be constitutionally dispositive, 63 it is
indicative of the permanent association of the judiciary with the executive
and legislative branches that the Sentencing Commission represents. Like
other public offices, Commission membership embraces concepts of tenure,
duration, emoluments and duties, 14 and involves the exercise of "signifi-
cant authority [under] the laws of the United States."1 5 The judges on
the Commission will exercise substantial rulemaking authority 6 on a
full-time basis,167 for a period of six years,"68 and, in the case of a district
political institutions must be directed. But it must be self-directed."); Meador, supra note 112, at
1046 (constitutional considerations foreclose administration of court system by member of executive
branch); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution, 28 MicH. L. REv. 870, 873 n.8, 882 n.31 (1930) (arguing that statute
authorizing President to deprive a judge of his seniority and rank within the judiciary would be
unconstitutional); cf. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 444 (1977) (less intrusive
on separation of powers for executive branch to supervise itself than for "Congress or some outside
agency" to perform function).
161. See supra notes 49-50.
162. But see Act of Mar. 4, 1911, ch. 241, 36 Stat. 1334 (1911) (President required to appoint
Justice to second class postal rate commission). Most statutes have been crafted with a particular
judge in mind and passed only with the assent of that judge. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 144, at 207
(legislation requiring justice to serve on War Ballot Commission changed when Chief Justice Stone
refused position).
163. See Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3199 n.10 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (statutory assignment of Chief Justice to Board of Regents of Smithsonian Institution de
minimis violation of separation of powers). But see In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime
Subpoena of Scarfo, 783 F.2d 370, 376 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1986) (statutory requirement that judges serve
on Sentencing Commission alone might render it unconstitutional).
164. See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 385, 393 (1867).
165. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
166. See In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scaduto, 763 F.2d 1191,
1205 (11th Cir. 1985) (Roney, J., concurring specially) (drawing distinction between advisory com-
missions and commissions with "autonomous authority to . . . implement final binding action").




judge, will receive an extra stipend."' 9 Indeed, Congress understood that
the Commissioners were officers of the United States when it decided to
place the appointment power with the President. 17 1
Finally, the nature of the Commission's authority is such that it might
well be unconstitutional even if it were solely within the judiciary. The
type of legislative rulemaking that the Sentencing Commission will engage
in both involves the judiciary in the decision of matters of broad public
policy outside the confines of a specific case 17 1 and breaks with the separa-
tion of powers in allowing the legislators who promulgated rules to also
apply them.1 72 As many commentators have noted, this power is justified
with respect to procedural rules because of the courts' special exper-
tise and because procedural rulemaking is inherent to the judicial pro-
cess. 17  Neither rationale applies to sentencing. The court has repeatedly
emphasized that the considerations that go into determining sentencing
ranges, such as deterrence and just deserts, are peculiarly a matter for
legislative determination. 74 Moreover, though courts may consider the ad-
vice and practices of other judges when imposing sentences, 17 5 the specifi-
cation of sentence ranges has never been considered an inherent judicial
function like the promulgation of court rules.17 The guidelines that the
federal Sentencing Commission will promulgate must of course be con-
strued and applied by the district courts in every sentencing and will
likely be frequently challenged on constitutional17  and statutory
'169. Id. In 1986, the differential between the salary of a court of appeals judge and a district
judge, which any district judge on the Commission would have received as an extra stipend, was
$4,500.
170. See 124 CONG. REc. 297 (1978) (memorandum of Morton Rosenberg).
171. See, e.g., Landers, supra note 135, at 854 n.43.
172. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 135, at 602.
173. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 54-55; Pound, supra note 135, at 602.
174. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1980); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,
393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment . . . these are
peculiarly questions of legislative policy."); United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 490 (1957). Under
well-established doctrine, a court may not usurp the legislative function in specifying sentence ranges
by imposing sentences on a mechanical basis. See, e.g., Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144
(8th Cir. 1973).
175. The extraordinary powers of the Sentencing Commission are highlighted by comparing it to
the Sentencing Councils in the judicial branch whose authority includes the development of principles
and criteria for sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 334(a)(5) (1982). Unlike the Sentencing Commission, a
Sentencing Council is composed solely of judges, and the principles that it develops are not binding on
judges and do not confer rights of appeal on the government or defendant.
176. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916) ("authority to define and fix the punishment
for crime is legislative"). In a dramatic move, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized precisely this
distinction, refusing legislatively granted authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines. In re Judicial
Admin.: Felony Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 353 N.W.2d 793 (1984). But see Frankel,
Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 53 (1972) (suggesting without analysis that "most
familiar precedent" for Sentencing Commission is authority of Supreme Court to promulgate proce-
dural rules).
177. See Tjoflat, A Practical Look at the Sentencing Provisions of S. 1722, 72 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 555, 579-90 (1981) (listing possible constitutional challenges).
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grounds17 8 in the courts of appeals. Judges on the Commission will thus
necessarily review their concurrent actions as legislators, implicating pre-
cisely the concerns that led to the rejection of the Council of Revision" 9
and that lie at the core of the separation of powers doctrine.1, 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal Sentencing Commission currently is constitutionally infirm.
The Sentencing Reform Act vests more legislative authority than the sepa-
ration of powers permits in an administrative agency composed of seven
presidential appointees. The confounding of the separate functions of the
different branches is aggravated by the requirement that judges be ap-
pointed to the Commission and subject to possible removal by the
President.
The hope for sentencing reform, however, is not dead. Congress may
reconstitute the Commission as an advisory body in the judiciary, 1 or
enact the guidelines into law, thus ensuring not only that the imposition of
the criminal sanction is structured by a set of principles but also that sen-
tencing guidelines will survive separation of powers challenges to their
constitutionality. A system of appellate review for all sentences could pre-
vent gross disparities.18 2 With these fundamental changes, the Commis-
sion can bring rationality to federal sentencing without compromising ju-
dicial independence or removing the essential legislative and judicial
checks on executive control of the criminal law.
178. See supra notes 41-45 (discussing appellate review of sentences).
179. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 144, at 203 (Letter from Chief Justice Stone to President
Roosevelt (July 20, 1942)) ("plainly inadmissible" for Justice "to pass upon proposals involving ques-
tions of constitutional power or other questions which would be subject to review by the courts"). The
argument that judges on the Commission might recuse themselves from cases where their impartiality
might be questioned, see In re President's Comm'n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scarfo, 783
F.2d 370, 381 (3d Cir. 1986), proves too much. As only a few judges exercise any of the rulemaking
power delegated to the judiciary, such an argument would effectively gut the separation of the legisla-
ture from the judiciary. The judiciary could exercise rulmaking power over any issue, no matter how
politically charged, so long as only a few judges exercised effective power. Moreover, recusal in all of
these cases would likely excessively burden the courts and neither redress the Commission member's
influence on his colleagues, see Comment, supra note 144, at 1013 & n.100, nor mitigate the impact
that politically controversial activity such as the promulgation of guidelines would have on the public's
perception of judicial impartiality.
181. See supra note 38 (discussing voluntary judicially-promulgated guidelines).
182. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES (1968) (recom-
mending appellate review).
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